Showing posts with label Theory. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Theory. Show all posts

Saturday, September 29, 2007

Bejtlich on Anemone and End System Monitoring



Bejtlich's Blog on Anemone reminded me on the [under]value of tools like iplog (it seems to have disappeared from the Debian package repository, it must have been back in 3.0 days and I know there were 3-4 of these types of tools, portsentry was another one) that simply log 3-5 tuple (src/dst/proto and ports) are raved about when they come from a router (i.e. NetFlow) but this value of this on the end system never got the attention it deserved? Maybe because there was no decent way to do analysis? Or the sort of logging was integrated into host-firewalls or IPS? Not sure.

Anyway, as part of more normal new Debian workstation/laptop install, I would always enable udp/tcp/icmp logging and back in the wild west worm days (2001-2003?) there was pretty interesting stuff deep within the campus network of a large enterprise where I worked. And before I knew what a BBMD was I found it due to the UDP broadcasts to 47808.

So the belief that there should be an easy for "dumb" end-hosts (that may be constantly joining, leaving, moving from wired to wireless, etc.) to share arbitray security info and P2P architectures such as those provided by JXTA seem to be a logical means of doing so. Whether something like this ultimately proves to be deployable or even useful, we shall see, but there is a lot more development ahead before we can say.

(BTW: the diagram came from Chapter 4 of the JXSE 2.5 Programmers guide)

Saturday, September 22, 2007

Concept Document Available

Although nothing has actually been written on this document since June, I finally put up an overview/concept document I wrote (with the help of a few others, Gadi Evron in particular) to help define the problem space.
...it does not take much creativity to imagine a toolset that utilizes the types of networks used by Skype, Gnutella, or Bittorrent to provide a global view of Internet threat activity where users might choose to view, contribute, or search security information sources as easily as they would share a directory on their filesystem or download MP3’s. Initially, this network might only provide equivalent data as DShield (sources, protocols, and ports) with several obvious advantages made possible through its distributed architecture: direct (i.e. non-aggregated) access to collection nodes, the lack of a single data owner, flexible group membership (and policy definition) whereby organizations and collections of individuals to share information within an Enterprise across the Internet.


A PDF version is also available, unless you are too scared to read PDFs anymore.